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Abstract 
It has been recognized that there is a need for requirements and guidance for design and operation of 
nuclear power plants.  This is becoming more important as more reactors are being proposed to be built.  In 
parallel with activities in individual countries are norms established by international organizations.  This paper 
discusses requirements/guidance for neutronic design and operation as promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  As an example, details are given for one reactor physics parameter, namely, 
the moderator temperature reactivity coefficient.  The requirements/guidance from the NRC are discussed in the 
context of those generated for the International Atomic Energy Agency.  The requirements/guidance are not 
identical from the two sources although they are compatible. 
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1. Introduction 
In the nuclear power industry, there is a need 
for standards (or requirements or guidance) to help 
assure that the product is of high quality and meets 
acceptable levels of safety.  Power reactor 
requirements/guidance have been developed in most 
countries operating such plants as well as in 
international organizations such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The interest in 
building new reactors throughout the world means 
that attention has to again focus on standards for 
design and operation.  In some countries that have 
no history of building power reactors (e.g., Turkey) 
or are considering totally different technologies 
relative to past experience (e.g., Canada), the issue 
of requirements/guidance becomes more pressing.  
In the United States (U.S.), an interest in improving 
the licensing process has led the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to consider 
requirements/guidance in a risk-informed and 
performance-based framework (Drouin, 2007).  This 
framework could be applied to evolutionary reactors 
or to designs that the NRC has yet to consider. 
In order to help understand how 
requirements/guidance emanate from the regulatory 
agency and how they relate to international norms, 
consider requirements and guidance for reactor 
physics (or equivalently, neutronic) design as 
promulgated by the NRC.  These impact not only 
how the reactor should be built, but also how it is 
operated.  Neutronic design refers to having an 
acceptable power distribution within the core, to the 
design and use of reactivity control systems for 
normal operation and for shutting down the reactor, 
to stability, and to the various reactivity feedback 
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characteristics.  This example from the U.S. can 
help guide what might be done in the future in other 
countries as well as what might be done in the U.S. 
with new requirements/guidance.  The discussion is 
also consistent with recent efforts to normalize 
requirements internationally (Reig, 2008) albeit that 
effort has not yet considered neutronic design.    
In the following sections an overview of the 
requirements and guidance in the U.S. is presented 
and the moderator temperature reactivity coefficient 
(MTC) is used to provide an example of how the 
requirements/guidance apply to a specific neutronic 
parameter.  The connection to the approach by the 
IAEA is then given.  Lastly, some general 
comments are presented. 
2. The approach in the U.S. 
2.1. General approach 
The approach taken by the NRC consists of 
requirements for reactor design that are rather 
general and guidance to the licensees on how to 
proceed, with that guidance in some instances being 
very specific and quantitative.  After years of 
experience, which includes the licensing of more 
than 100 units, multiple reloads at each unit, 
numerous design changes, and several design 
certifications of proposed nuclear power plants, this 
guidance has become synonymous with 
requirements. 
The resulting design is documented by the 
licensee in its Safety Analysis Report (SAR) which 
becomes a part of the licensing basis.  The design is 
verified through testing that is specified in the SAR 
and the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), and 
through the NRC inspection process. 
The general approach is shown schematically in 
Figure 1 and applies to reactor design, not just the 
neutronic or reactor physics design.  The high level 
design requirements are specified in Title 10 Code 
of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10CFR50), 
Appendix A, entitled General Design Criteria 
(GDC).*  The guidance that is used to implement the 
GDC is found in several places but most notably in 
the Standard Review Plan (SRP, aka NUREG-0800) 
a document first written in the 1970s and recently 
(March 2007) updated for the first time in 25 years 
for applicability to new license applications.  The 
SRP is written as guidance for the NRC staff in 
                                                 
* NRC deocuments referenced herein can be found at 
http://www.nrc.gov. 
reviewing an SAR, however, it has the effect of also 
providing guidance to the applicant as to what 
should be in the SAR and hence, how the reactor 
should be designed.  Indeed, an applicant (as 
specified in 10CFR50.34, “Contents of 
Applications; Technical Information”) must 
“provide an evaluation of the facility against the 
SRP.”  An applicant has the option of proposing a 
different approach but knows that this might require 
reversing a long-standing regulatory position.  The 
SRP in turn refers to Regulatory Guides and Branch 
Technical Positions which further codify what is 
expected of the licensee. 
There are other guidance documents that also 
influence reactor design.  One of the most important 
of these is the Regulatory Guide (RG) entitled 
“Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis 
Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (LWR Edition)” 
[originally RG 1.70, and now published as RG 1.206 
for combined construction and operating license 
(COL) applications].  This guide provides guidance 
on what information should be in the SAR and 
therefore, indirectly, says something about reactor 
design.  Other relevant documents are:  10CFR50 
Appendix B, “Quality Assurance Criteria for 
Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 
Plants;” and the “Standard Technical Specifications”  
that are approved by the NRC for each reactor 
vendor. 
There is also an influence from “industry” 
consensus standards that have been written by 
subject matter experts that may come from either 
vendors, licensees, national and private laboratories, 
consultants, and/or the NRC.  These standards have 
been referenced directly in the SRP and/or have 
been used by the licensee and referenced in the 
SAR.  Lastly, the vendors and licensees that are 
directly involved with reactor design may have their 
own internal requirements that impact reactor 
design. 
The result of all these influences is the 
description of reactor and other system designs in 
the SAR.  Just as significant is the way in which the 
reactor design is verified during operation.  This is 
done through the testing requirements found in 
Chapter 14 (“Initial Test Program and ITAAC-
Design Certification”) of the SAR and the 
surveillance requirements found in the Tech Specs.  
The latter are formally Chapter 16 of the SAR but 
also usually an appendix to the license itself.  Since 
the core design may change with each reload, the 
Tech Specs refer to the Core Operating Limits 
Report (COLR) issued for a particular reload. 
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Figure 1  NRC General Approach to Reactor Design 
Control 
2.2. Application to the MTC 
It is instructive to show one example of the 
application of the aforementioned requirements and 
guidance; namely, the moderator temperature 
coefficient (MTC) for a pressurized water reactor 
(PWR).  Figure 2 shows how design of the MTC is 
determined using the same influences shown in 
Figure 1. 
The two GDC that are relevant are GDC 10 and 
11: 
GDC-10 Reactor Design:  The reactor core and 
associated coolant, control, and protection systems 
shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure 
that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not 
exceeded during any condition of normal operation, 
including the effects of anticipated operational 
occurrences. 
GDC-11 Reactor Inherent Protection:  The 
reactor core and associated coolant systems shall be 
designed so that in the power operating range the 
net effect of the prompt inherent nuclear feedback 
characteristics tends to compensate for a rapid 
increase in reactivity. 
The MTC impacts the core response to various 
anticipated operational occurrences and, therefore, 
helps determine if specified acceptable fuel design 
limits (SAFDLs) are not exceeded.  Hence, it is 
clear that GDC-10 applies.  GDC-11 has always 
been interpreted as stating that the power coefficient 
of reactivity should be negative and since the MTC 
has an impact on the power coefficient (albeit the 
most important component is usually the fuel 
temperature coefficient) it is impacted by this GDC 
as well. 
The section of the SRP that applies to the 
design of the MTC is Section 4.3, “Nuclear Design.”  
This section refers to GDC-10 and GDC-11 (and 
others).  With respect to reactivity coefficients the 
primary guidance is that the licensee must consider 
all reactor states (cold shutdown through full power, 
the extremes reached during a transient/accident, 
different times within a fuel cycle, different control 
rod patterns, etc.); the coefficients used in analyses 
must be shown to be conservative; and an 
uncertainty analysis for nominal values must be 
carried out.  For the MTC, the latter can be done by 
comparing calculated values with measured values. 
It is noted in SRP Section 4.3 that in 
conjunction with satisfying GDC-11:  “There are no 
criteria that explicitly establish acceptable ranges of 
[reactivity] coefficient values or preclude the  
acceptability of a positive MTC such as may exist in 
PWRs at beginning of core life.”  However, it does 
state that “The MTC should be non-positive over the 
entire fuel cycle when the reactor is at a significant 
power level.” 
Other guidance that is important for the MTC 
has to do with verification.  In Section 14, 
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance 
Criteria (ITAAC) are discussed generically.  
Detailed guidance is found in “Standard Technical 
Specifications” issued by the NRC for each reactor 
“Industry” 
Consensus 
 Standards 
Licensee/ 
Vendor 
Requirements 
Standard Review 
Plan 
& Related 
Regulatory 
Guides & 
Branch 
Technical 
Positions 
Other NRC 
Guides: 
Std. Format and 
Content of 
SAR; Q/A 
Requirements; 
Std. Tech 
Specs; … 
LICENSING BASIS AS GIVEN IN 
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 
& 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
General Design Criteria 
(10CFR50 Appendix A) 
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vendor and then in the Tech Specs for each plant.  
The Tech Specs refer to the COLRs which are 
 
Figure 2  NRC Approach to MTC Design Control 
 
issued every cycle with the specifications for the 
MTC and the surveillance requirements. 
Information on the MTC that is given in the 
COLR includes the lower bound (largest magnitude 
of a negative value).  This is influenced by the 
response of the reactor to a steamline break which 
cools the secondary and hence, also the primary 
coolant.  The cooling adds reactivity because the 
MTC is negative, and although injection of 
additional soluble boron is expected, the concern is 
that the reactivity balance, even with all control 
banks inserted, can lead to a recriticality.  The more 
negative the MTC, the greater the potential for a 
problem and hence the lower bound. 
The COLR also specifies an upper bound on the 
MTC as a function of power level.  This upper limit 
must be no larger than zero at 100% of rated power 
as stated in the SRP.  (Hence, the largest value is 
really the smallest magnitude of the negative MTC.)  
How large it might be is influenced by the core 
response to transients/accidents and to anticipated 
transients without scram (ATWS).  In an ATWS 
initiated by a loss of feedwater, the primary coolant 
temperature increases.  Hence, the larger the MTC, 
(smallest magnitude but less than zero), the less of a 
mitigating factor it is because it is less effective in 
lowering the power.  The lower the MTC (negative 
with large absolute value) the more power will be 
reduced as the primary heats up and this would help 
prevent the increase in pressure (due to the increase 
in primary temperature) from exceeding limits. 
GDC -10 REACTOR DESIGN
GDC-11 INHERENT 
NEGATIVE FEEDBACK 
The COLR also specifies the surveillance 
requirements for the MTC.  Since the MTC is the 
one reactivity coefficient that is straightforward to 
measure, this is an important means of verifying the 
nuclear design 
There are consensus standards that have been 
developed by the American Nuclear Society (ANS), 
and then approved by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI), which are relevant to the 
MTC.  “Calculation and Measurement of the 
Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity in 
Water Moderated Power Reactors,” ANSI/ANS-
19.11-2002 discusses the measurement at power 
conditions as well as the calculation of the MTC and 
“Reload Startup Physics Tests for Pressurized Water 
Reactors,”ANSI/ANS-19.6.1-2005, discusses the 
measurement of the isothermal temperature 
coefficient at hot zero power conditions.  Although 
these standards are relevant and have been used by 
licensees (and ANSI/ANS-19.6.1 has been 
referenced in SARs), they are not referenced in the 
SRP.  Note too that other reactor physics standards 
for the calculation of parameters exist; however, 
they do not impose requirements/guidance for those 
parameters. 
The box shown in Figure 2 that indicates 
licensee/vendor requirements refers to design 
control procedures that are used in industry.  They 
are usually proprietary and hence, they have not 
been surveyed for this paper. 
3. Relation to the approach by the IAEA 
The IAEA publishes “Safety Standards” which 
include “Safety Fundamentals,” “Safety 
ANS 19 
Reactor Physics 
Standards 
Licensee/ 
Vendor 
Requirements? 
RG-1.206 
Sect.C.I.4.3; 
Std. Tech Specs 
Section 3.1.3, 
MTC;  
ATWS 
literature 
SRP 
Sect. 4.3 
(Nuclear Design) 
Sect. 14 (Tests) 
Sect. 16 
 (Tech Specs) 
 
 
SAR Section 4.3 (Nuclear Design) 
SAR Section 14.3 
(Reload Physics Test Program) 
Tech Specs on MTC 
Core Operating Limits Report 
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Requirements,” and “Safety Guides.”  These are not 
consensus standards of the same type as those 
produced by, for example ANSI, or the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), nor are they 
legally binding on member states.  They can be very 
useful for those countries that have not developed 
their own literature on the subject or as further 
support for existing regulatory documents, or in 
either case, as the basis for more detailed 
requirements.  With respect to reactor physics there 
are four documents of interest.  In the following we 
consider these documents in the context of the 
MTC. 
“Safety of Nuclear Power Plants:  Design” 
(IAEA, 2000) applies to water cooled reactors [light 
water reactors (LWRs) and heavy water reactors 
(HWRs)].  This is a wide ranging document which 
provides requirements similar to that provided in the 
NRC’s GDC.  Under a section on the design of 
“Reactor Core and Associated Features” there are 
requirements for:  General Design, Fuel Elements 
and Assemblies, Control of the Reactor Core, and 
Reactor Shutdown, all of which impact the 
neutronic design. 
Consider the requirements most directly related 
to reactivity insertion or feedback and hence the 
MTC.  (The numbering is from the original 
document.) 
6.1 The reactor core and associated coolant, 
control and protection systems shall be designed 
with appropriate margins to ensure that the 
specified design limits are not exceeded and that 
radiation safety standards are applied in all 
operational states and in design basis accidents, 
with account taken of the existing uncertainties. 
6.3 The maximum degree of positive reactivity 
and its maximum rate of increase by insertion in 
operational states and design basis accidents shall 
be limited so that no resultant failure of the reactor 
pressure boundary will occur, cooling capability 
will be maintained and no significant damage will 
occur to the reactor core. 
6.4 It shall be ensured in the design that the 
possibility of recriticality or reactivity excursion 
following a postulated initiating event is minimized. 
6.8 Specified fuel design limits, including 
permissible leakage of fission products, shall not be 
exceeded in normal operation, and it shall be 
ensured that operational states that may be imposed 
in anticipated operational occurrences cause no 
significant further deterioration.  Leakage of fission 
products shall be restricted by design limits and 
kept to a minimum. 
6.9 Fuel Assemblies shall be designed to 
permit adequate inspection of their structure and 
component parts after irradiation.  In design basis 
accidents, the fuel elements shall remain in position 
and shall not suffer distortion to an extent that 
would render post-accident core cooling 
insufficiently effective; and the specified limits for 
fuel elements for design basis accidents shall not be 
exceeded. 
6.15  At least one of the two systems shall be, on 
its own, capable of quickly rendering the nuclear 
reactor subcritical by an adequate margin from 
operational states and in design basis accidents, on 
the assumption of a single failure.  Exceptionally, a 
transient recriticality may be permitted provided 
that the specified fuel and component limits are not 
exceeded. 
Paragraphs 6.1, 6.8, and 6.9 are general 
requirements on plant response to transients and 
accidents and hence to reactivity feedback and the 
MTC.  In particular, the MTC is most important in 
anticipated operational occurrences as cited in §6.8 
which is analogous to GDC-10.  More specific 
acceptance criteria for transients/accidents are 
provided for PWRs in an IAEA “Safety Report” 
(IAEA, 2003).  The Safety Reports Series are 
informational publications and do not establish 
requirements or make recommendations.  
Nevertheless, the acceptance criteria enumerated in 
them are quite comprehensive and could form the 
basis for regulatory guidance. 
Paragraph 6.3 above, addresses the amount of 
positive reactivity and rate of insertion that is 
allowed.  This applies specifically to control 
elements in the core but does not preclude 
consideration of reactivity inserted by, for example, 
the entrance of cold water into a core with a 
negative MTC. 
Paragraph 6.4 provides further limits on 
reactivity.  The possibility of recriticality implies 
shutdown first, e.g., as in the steamline break 
scenario discussed above.  The possibility of a 
reactivity excursion for a PWR could be the 
injection of cold and/or unborated water into the 
core.  This paragraph, however, is somewhat 
contradicted by §6.15 which allows for recriticality 
during an event. 
There are no IAEA requirements for a negative 
power coefficient or something akin to the GDC-11 
requirement that there be prompt inherent nuclear 
feedback that compensates for a reactivity insertion.  
Instead, this is treated in a guidance document. 
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The Safety Guide pertaining to neutronic design 
that follows from the above IAEA Safety 
Requirements document is “Design of the Reactor 
Core for Nuclear Power Plants” (IAEA, 2005) and it 
is also applicable to both LWRs and HWRs.  This 
document provides more guidance but still at a level 
that is not prescriptive to the extent that it could be.  
With respect to the examples above of IAEA 
requirements for reactivity feedback an important 
statement is: 
2.11  The design of the reactor core should be 
such that the feedback characteristics of the core 
rapidly compensate for an increase in reactivity.  
The reactor power should be controlled by a 
combination of the inherent neutronic 
characteristics of the reactor core, its thermal-
hydraulic characteristics and the capability of the 
control and shutdown systems to actuate for all 
operational states and in design basis accident 
conditions… 
The first sentence of §2.11 clearly states the 
need for a negative power coefficient.  However, it 
seems to be mitigated by the more lenient language 
in the second sentence and in the IAEA Safety 
Requirements document quoted above.  The latter 
places the onus on meeting an acceptable fuel limit 
rather than on requiring negative feedback during a 
reactivity insertion event.  Again, however, the 
importance to the MTC may be minimal when it is 
only a minor contributor to the power coefficient. 
More specific information on the MTC is found 
in this guideline in Appendix I.  One of the 
significant comments made therein is: 
However, a slightly positive temperature 
coefficient of reactivity for the coolant-moderator is 
acceptable if the overall feedback effect on 
reactivity with temperature is sufficiently negative to 
limit the power increase to acceptable values.   
The third IAEA document that is relevant is 
“Format and Content of the Safety Analysis Report 
for Nuclear Power Plants” (IAEA, 2004).  It is 
analogous to the NRC Regulatory Guides mentioned 
above.  It provides general guidance for 
documenting design but no specific 
requirements/guidance on what that design should 
include. 
“Core Management and Fuel Handling for 
Nuclear Power Plants” (IAEA, 2002) is the fourth 
relevant IAEA document.  It deals mostly with 
subjects not directly related to neutronic design.  
However, it does mention nuclear parameters that 
are to be considered in the design and also suggests 
tests which can be used to verify core design.  As 
with the previous guide, with respect to the MTC 
only general information is presented, i.e., no 
specific requirements/guidance is provided. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Reactor physics design is influenced by the 
NRC through high level criteria/requirements and 
very specific guidance that comes from several 
documents of which the GDC and the SRP are two 
of the most important.  The design is documented in 
the SAR which is a licensing-basis document.  The 
verification of the design is specified in NRC 
guidance documents and then further bolstered by 
the NRC’s inspection program which provides 
assurance that Tech Specs are being followed. 
The requirements/guidance for the MTC are 
compatible with international norms as specified by 
the IAEA.  In general this is true for other neutronic 
parameters, however, there are exceptions.  An 
example is the requirement for a negative power 
coefficient as delineated in GDC-11.  For the IAEA 
this issue is treated as part of guidance which 
emphasizes compliance with fuel limits rather than 
inherent feedback.   
In summary, this paper lays out the 
requirements/guidance for reactor physics design in 
the U.S.  It is of interest because of the increase in 
new reactor design, licensing, construction, and 
operation that is underway and because of the 
continuing interest in normalizing such 
requirements/guidance internationally.  
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